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Levantine Challenges on 
Turkish Foreign Policy
Mustafa Aydın – Cihan Dizdaroğlu
Introduction
Modern day Turkey has not seen itself as part of the Levant and has 
not looked at the region as an integrated unit of analysis until recently, 
and thus has not taken a holistic approach towards the region. Turkey’s 
perception of the Eastern Mediterranean was restricted to Cyprus, and 
the rest of the Levant was construed as part of the wider Middle East.1 
Accordingly, the Turkish academic literature does not refer to the Levant, 
except on rare occasions where it actually discusses the Cyprus problem.2
Regardless, as one of the most powerful states in the region, Turkey 
has been an important actor in Levantine politics and played an active 
role in the region during the 1930s in response to Italy’s expansionist 
tendencies towards the Eastern Mediterranean. The 1936 proposal to 
create Mediterranean Pact was one such example. But by the outbreak 
of the Second World War, these sporadic ideas had not yet transformed 
(1) İlter Turan, “Turkey and the Mediterranean: Balancing Geopolitics and Geo-Economics”, 
German Marshall Fund Mediterranean Policy Program Policy Brief, 2011, p. 1; Kemal Kirişci, 
“Comparing the Neighbourhood Policies of Turkey and the EU in the Mediterranean” in Meliha 
Benli Altunışık, Kemal Kirişci and Nathalie Tocci (eds.), Turkey: Reluctant Mediterranean Power, 
Washington D.C., German Marshall Fund, 2011, p. 23.
(2) Turan, “Turkey and the Mediterranean”, pp. 1-6; Kirişci, “Comparing the Neighbourhood”, 
pp. 21-44; Ebru Oğurlu, “Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Turkish 
Foreign Policy”, Instituto Affari Internazionali Working Paper, No 1204, 2012, pp. 1-15.
into a full-fledged regional policy and then after the war, the region was 
perceived only within the context of the emerging East-West rivalry.3
The end of the Cold War allowed Turkey to redefine its priorities in 
international politics. Prompted by its growing economic needs after the 
liberalization program of the early 1980s, Turkey prioritized its economic 
relationships in its neighbourhood rather than focusing on global security 
concerns. This transformation into what Kirişçi referred to as a  ‘trading 
state’ saw Turkey increase its focus on its neighbourhood.4 The Levant, 
however, with the exception of Israel, remained rather insignificant in 
most of the early post-Cold War era. Only after the rise of the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP) to power in 2002 did the wider Middle East, 
including the Levant, attract increased attention from Turkey.
While the JDP emphasized the importance of economic prosperity and 
stability in Turkey’s neighbourhood, the country’s regional policies shifted 
in several aspects. Rather than focusing on long-standing problems 
such as the Cypriot imbroglio, the JDP preferred new policy tools to 
improve Turkey’s relations with its neighbours such as visa-liberalization, 
mediation, building industrial zones and free trade areas, and joint 
cabinet meetings. Thus, a new policy line, formulated as ‘zero problems 
with neighbours’, was spearheaded by Ahmed Davutoğlu, the then Chief 
Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister and later the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs.5
(3) Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkey as a ‘Mediterranean Power’ ”, in Altunışık, Kirişci and Tocci 
(eds.), Turkey: Reluctant Mediterranean Power, p. 9.
(4) Kemal Kirişci, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, 
New Perspectives on Turkey, No 40, 2009, pp. 29-57.
(5) Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [The Strategic Depth], İstanbul, Küre, 2001; Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, “Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 10 (1), 
2008, pp. 77-96; Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Conference Speech at 
SETA Foundation Washington D.C. Branch, 8 December 2009; Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Perspectives 
on Turkish Foreign Policy”, Speech at the Brookings Institution, 29 November 2010.
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In addition to the new policy approach, the country’s political 
transformation and the emergence of new political classes with different 
preferences as well as the problems in accession negotiations with the 
EU triggered a transformation in Turkish foreign policy. Especially after 
JDP’s second electoral victory in 2007, Turkey began to focus more closely 
on what it deemed it’s neighbourhood, an area that encompassed the 
Levant, the Near East (including Iran and the South Caucasus), and North 
Africa. As a result, Turkey’s relations with the countries of the region have 
increased considerably and reorientation of its foreign policy has become 
discernable.
Meanwhile, several regional and international developments provided 
momentum for Turkey’s engagement with the Levant. First, the 
discoveries of hydrocarbon resources off the coasts of Israel, Cyprus and 
Egypt (Tamar field in 2009, Leviathan in 2010, Aphrodite in 2011, and 
Zohr in 2015) presented opportunities not only for the littoral states, but 
also for international actors. While the newly found reserves, with an 
estimated 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas in the Levant Basin, 
sparked a debate over the region’s potential to become an additional 
source of energy for European markets,6 it also encouraged Turkey 
in its strategy aimed at turning it into an ‘energy hub’ in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. As it is at the centre of the most direct and economic 
transport route from the region to Europe, Turkey is uniquely positioned 
to benefit from the development of Levantine energy resources. However, 
new challenges emerged as a result of these discoveries in terms of 
ownership of the resources, delimitation of territorial waters, maritime 
borders, and exclusive economic zones under conflicting atmosphere.
(6) “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern 
Mediterranean”, U.S. Geological Survey, March 2010, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/
FS10-3014.pdf (Accessed 12 February 2014). 
Secondly, the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings in late 2010 created 
additional security problems for regional and international actors. Like 
others, Turkey was caught unprepared by the widespread political 
instability of the region, which subsequently has had a serious impact 
on Turkey’s domestic stability as well as its relations with the regional 
states. While Turkey had earlier managed to establish somewhat workable 
political and economic relations with the existing regimes in the region, 
the chaos that followed the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings has 
disrupted these relations. Whereas Turkey previously faced an ‘ethics 
versus interest’ dilemma in its connections with the autocratic regimes,7 its 
policies of supporting pro-democracy actors, providing aid to opposition 
groups, and aiming for regime change in neighbouring countries has 
resulted in short-term problems and long-term uncertainties.
Finally, various developments in the surrounding region over the last few 
decades, such as the instability wrought by United States’ invasion of Iraq to 
the continued stagnation of the Arab-Israeli peace process, have continued 
to fuel region-wide turmoil, increasing political instability, slowing economic 
development, and affecting the balance of power. While the region’s 
full potential could only be unleashed with the onset of stability, history 
demonstrates that stability can only be established when the region is 
controlled by a hegemonic power,8 or an agreement is achieved among the 
paternalist states.9 
(7) Ziya Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a 
Turbulent Middle East”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 19 (2), 2014, p. 6.
(8) Volkan Ş. Ediger, Balkan Devlen and Deniz Bingöl McDonald, “Levant’ta Büyük Oyun: 
Doğu Akdeniz’in Enerji Jeopolitiği [Great Game in Levant: Energy Geopolitics of the Eastern 
Mediterranean], Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol.  9 (33), p. 80. 
(9) Mustafa Aydın and Damla Aras, “Political Conditionality of Economic Relations Between 
Paternalist States: Turkey’s Interaction with Iran, Iraq, and Syria”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 27 
(1-2), 2005, pp. 21-43.
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This paper will first look at the recent history of Turkey’s relations with the 
Levantine countries. Then, it will focus on the regional and international 
developments that influence Turkey’s policies towards the region. It will 
argue that developments in recent years have provided space for Turkey to 
take a more active role in the region, but that Turkey’s own limitations, policy 
choices, and regional dynamics have restricted its ability to do so.
Recent History of Turkey’s Levant Connection
Since late 1990s, Turkey’s engagement with the Levant, and more broadly 
with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, has become 
increasingly noticeable. In the absence of a clearly defined Levant 
policy, the sum of Turkey’s bilateral relations with regional countries 
encapsulates its overall Levant policy.
After decades of tense relations with some of the regional countries, 
primarily the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and Syria, Turkey became eager in 
early 2000s to solve or at least move beyond these problems. Modification 
of its foreign policy away from security concerns towards an economic focus 
originally appeared as a result of Turkey’s move from import-substitution 
development strategy to an export-led growth strategy in the 1980s. The 
liberalization of the Turkish economy prompted the county to focus on 
nearby markets. Economic considerations would become paramount during 
the 1990s when Turkey ‘became increasingly concerned with…striking deals 
with foreign governments’ in an effort to sell its goods and generate foreign 
direct investment.10 By the time JDP came to power in 2002, the economic 
consequences of foreign policy were already weighing heavily on decision-
making and the main policy motto of the time, i.e., ‘zero problems with 
(10) Mustafa Aydın, “Twenty Years Before, Twenty Years After: Turkish Foreign Policy at the 
Threshold of the 21st Century”, in Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (eds.), Turkey’s Foreign 
Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics, New York, Ashgate, 2003, p. 12. 
neighbours’, was mainly built upon the pre-JDP perspective of developing 
closer relations with neighbours to further economic prosperity.
Accordingly, a new line of policy, designed to benefit from Turkey’s central 
location and historical connections was put forward by the JDP during the 
2000s.11 One of the earliest examples was Turkey’s Cyprus policy, where the 
first JDP government implemented a major policy shift when it supported the 
peace plan brokered by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2004. This 
move could be seen within the wider context of Turkey’s changing Levant policy 
and moving away from exclusive determinacy of security concerns.12
In its first term (2002-2007), the JDP focused mainly on Turkey’s approximation 
with the EU law and the related domestic reforms, eventually leading the 
country to begin accession negotiations with the EU in October 2005. These 
negotiations would have significant implications on the future course of Turkish 
foreign policy. The reforms in general improved the country’s political stability, 
supported economic growth, enabled major strides towards democratization, 
decreased the role of military in political life, and helped change the foreign 
policy decision-making process. As a result, the influence of the military in 
decision-making decreased significantly and the policy-shaping role of the 
National Security Council diminished.13 As the military had played a decisive 
role throughout the 1990s on Turkey’s international relations, the decline of its 
influence also had a profound affect on the country’s foreign policy.14
(11) Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007”, p. 78.
(12) Altunışık, “Turkey as a ‘Mediterranean Power’”, p. 15.
(13) Mustafa Aydın and Sinem Akgül Açıkmeşe, “Europeanization through EU Conditionality: 
Understanding the New Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Journal of Southern Europe and the 
Balkans, Vol. 9 (3), 2007, p. 269. 
(14) Ümit Cizre, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy”, Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 29 (2), 1997, pp. 151-166; Gencer Özcan, “Facing its Waterloo in Diplomacy: Turkey’s Military 
in Foreign Policy-Making Process”, New Perspectives on Turkey, No 40, 2009, pp. 83-102; Ali L. 
Karaosmanoğlu, “Transformation of Turkey’s Civil-Military Relations Culture and International 
Environment”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12 (2), 2011, pp. 253-264.
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In the meantime, the emergence of a new Anatolian bourgeoisie also had 
an impact on Turkey’s policies in its neighbourhood. Through their closer 
connection with the government, the newly established Independent 
Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD) of small to 
medium sized businesses from Anatolia pushed for closer economic 
relations with the countries in the wider Middle East.15 Using Turkey’s 
geographical proximity and their cultural affinity, these businessmen 
enthusiastically penetrated into the Levant,16 forcing the foreign policy 
establishment to follow them. As a result, until disrupted by the Arab 
Spring, JDP governments expanded Turkey’s relations with neighbouring 
countries using new tools such as visa-liberalization, free trade-zones, and 
joint cabinet meetings.
The most dramatic change was seen in the transformation of relations 
with Syria. After the signature of the Adana Agreement on 20 October 
1998, following a near-war crisis, relations between Syria and Turkey 
began to improve. The two countries signed a Free Trade Agreement 
in December 2004, and simultaneously established the Turkish-Syrian 
Business Council.17 Free trade agreements were also signed with Egypt 
in 2005, Lebanon in 2010, and Jordan in 2011. To increase the dialogue 
with these countries, High-Level Strategic Cooperation Councils were 
established and visa requirements were lifted for citizens of Syria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon in 2009. Moreover, at Turkey’s initiative, the ‘Close 
Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council’ was established 
in July 2010 with Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and a call was issued to 
(15) Özlem Tür, “Economic Relations with the Middle East Under the AKP-Trade, Business 
Community and Reintegration with Neighbouring Zones”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12 (4), 2011, pp. 
589-602. 
(16) Mustafa Kutlay, “Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign Policy’: A Political 
Economy Explanation”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 13 (1), 2011, p. 76.
(17) Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, “From Distant Neighbours to Partners? Changing 
Syrian-Turkish Relations”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37 (2), 2006, pp. 229-248; Meliha Benli Altunışık, 
“Turkey’s Changing Middle East Policy”, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No 23, 2010, p. 152.
establish the ‘East Mediterranean Four: Levant Business Forum’ to 
encourage greater economic integration among these states.18 With these 
moves, Turkey’s economic relations with the Levant expanded steadily 
and its volume of trade increased significantly.
The closer relations with Israel established during the second part of 
1990s mainly on the basis of security cooperation not only continued 
during the first term of the JDP, but also expanded with Turkey’s attempt 
to play a facilitator role between Israel, Syria, and Palestine.19 However, 
relations have since deteriorated with strong criticism of Israel coming 
from Prime Minister Erdoğan after Israel’s 2008 ‘Operation Cast Lead’ 
in Gaza.20 While the criticism of Israel increased the popularity of the 
JDP in Turkey and in the Arab Middle East, it led to worsening relations 
between the two countries. Another contributing incident occurred with 
the verbal skirmish between Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President 
Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009.21 The 
turbulent relations finally led to a breaking point with the Mavi Marmara 
incident in May 2010, when Israeli troops attacked an international flotilla 
sailing towards Gaza with the intent to break the Israeli siege. The Israeli 
attack on the flotilla resulted in the death of eight Turkish citizens. While 
diplomatic relations ended with the withdrawal of Turkish Ambassador 
(18) Kemal Kirişci, “Arab Uprisings and Completing Turkey's Regional Integration: Challenges 
and Opportunities for US-Turkish Relations”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol. 15 
(2), 2013, p. 193; Tür, “Economic Relations with the Middle East”, p. 597.
(19) Meliha Benli Altunışık and Esra Çuhadar, “Turkey’s Search for a Third Party Role in Arab–
Israeli Conflicts: A Neutral Facilitator or a Principal Power Mediator?”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 
15 (3), 2010, pp. 371-392; İlker Aytürk, “The Coming of an Ice Age? Turkish-Israeli Relations Since 
2002”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 12 (4), 2011, pp. 675-687.
(20) “Gaza and Strains in Israeli-Turkish Relations”, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 January 2010, 
https://www.cfr.org/interview/gaza-and-strains-israeli-turkish-relations (Accessed 15 December 
2017). 
(21) “Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel”, The New York Times, 29 January 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html (Accessed 15 December 
2017).
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to Israel, thanks to the Free Trade Agreement signed in 1996, economic 
relations continued to expand and trade volumes grew with the sole 
exceptions being 2009 and 2012 
Turkey also contributed to international efforts to bring peace to 
the region. When the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was 
established in 2006 after the Israel-Hezbollah War, Turkey contributed 
one frigate and allowed the interim force to use the Mersin Port. Working 
with Qatar, Turkey played an instrumental role in brokering the Doha 
Agreement on 21 May 2008 that ended the political stalemate in Lebanon. 
Similarly, Turkey played a mediator role between Israel and Syria, which 
would lead to the May 2008 announcement that Israel and Syria had 
been talking to each other indirectly through Turkey.22 In a similar vein, 
Turkey launched the ‘Industry for Peace Initiative’ in 2005 and established 
the Ankara Forum to enable a tripartite dialogue mechanism between 
Turkish, Israeli and Palestinian business communities.23 All these initiatives 
collapsed, however, with the ‘Operation Cast Lead’ in December 2008. 
Taken together, Turkey’s engagement with the Levant, though started in 
the late 1990s, increased gradually during the 2000s. With the new policy 
line and the tools connected with it, Turkey succeeded in establishing 
good political and economic relations with most countries in the region.
(22)“Assad confirms Turkish mediation with Israel”, The Guardian, 24 April 2008, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/24/syria.israelandthepalestinians (Accessed 6 May 2018).
(23) “TEPAV Hosted the Three Presidents”, TEPAV, 13 November 2007, http://www.tepav.org.tr/
en/haberler/s/1101   (Accessed 8 February 2014). 
Energy Dimension
The discovery of offshore hydrocarbon resources in the eastern 
Mediterranean added a new dimension to Levantine politics. Despite the 
region’s potential as an additional energy supplier to Europe, existing 
disputes over maritime borders and sovereign rights posed significant 
barriers. As the maritime borders between the regional countries had 
not been demarcated before the energy discoveries were made, national 
claims on the resources overlap and have created a rather tense political 
environment in the eastern Mediterranean.24
Turkey’s concerns mainly relate to its and the Turkish Cypriots’ sovereign 
rights in sea. Since 2003, the RoC has been negotiating delimitation 
agreements with coastal countries, excluding Turkey, and has granted 
licenses for exploration and production. Turkey first criticized the RoC 
because it was not included in these negotiations, though geographical 
features of the region require multilateral approach. Turkey’s second 
criticism was centred on its argument that the RoC does not have a 
legitimate claim to represent the entire island of Cyprus. Turkey insists 
that RoC is not entitled to negotiate and adopt agreements in the absence 
of the Turkish Cypriot community, and that any resources exploited in 
future should belong to all Cypriots. Turkey further argues that, in the 
absence of an agreement between the two sides on the island on how 
to use potential natural resources, the appropriation of resources has to 
wait until a comprehensive solution is found. Even if the two sides on the 
island agree on a solution, Turkey argues, there is a need for negotiation 
between Turkey and the future state of Cyprus to delimit the sea between 
them.
(24) Walid Khadduri, “East Mediterranean Gas: Opportunities and Challenges”, Mediterranean 
Politics, Vol. 17 (1), 2012, p. 111.
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Nevertheless, the RoC signed exclusive economic zone (EEZ) agreements 
with Egypt on 17 February 2003, Lebanon on 17 January 2007, and with 
Israel on 17 December 2010. In response, Turkey made several demarches 
with these countries and protested its exclusion from the negotiations, 
though was not able to prevent the signatures. The RoC adopted a law 
in February 2007 to identify 13 oil exploration fields around the island 
and launched its first international tender for offshore exploration on 
15 February 2007, prompting Turkey to warn all interested parties to act 
responsibly and not harm the prospects for a comprehensive Cyprus 
solution.25 Finally, a US-registered company, Noble Energy, began drilling 
in the RoC’s Aphrodite field on 19 September 2011. In response, Turkey 
concluded a continental shelf delimitation agreement with the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on 21 September 201126 and in 
April 2012 authorized Turkish Petroleum Company to begin offshore 
exploration off the coast of the island in areas that overlap with six 
exploration fields also claimed by the RoC.
In addition to the discoveries on the Aphrodite field, another Noble Energy 
led consortium had earlier discovered Tamar field in January 2009 off 
the coast of Israel, with estimated reserves of 9 tcf of gas, and Leviathan 
field in December 2010, with estimated reserves of 16 tcf of gas.27 Finally, 
in August 2015, ENI of Italy discovered Zohr field off Egypt with more 
than 30 tcf of potential gas in August 2015.28 These discoveries raised 
(25)Statement of the Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 August 2007, http://www.mfa.
gov.tr/_p_qa_32---statement-of-the-spokesman-of-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-in-
response-to-a-question-_unofficial-translation___p_en.mfa (Accessed 14 February 2014).
(26) Press Statement No. 216, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 September 2011, http://www.mfa.
gov.tr/no_-216_-21-september-2011_-press-statement-on-the-continental-shelf-delimitation-
agreement-signed-between-turkey-and-the-trnc.en.mfa (Accessed 14 December 2014).
(27) Khadduri, “East Mediterranean Gas”, pp. 113-114. 
(28) “Eni begins producing from Zohr, the largest ever discovery of gas in the Mediterranean 
Sea”, ENI, 20 December 2017, https://www.eni.com/en_IT/media/2017/12/eni-begins-producing-
from-zohr-the-largest-ever-discovery-of-gas-in-the-mediterranean-sea (Accessed 8 March 2018).
hopes for possibility of exporting energy to Europe after meeting local 
demand.It was hoped that a pipeline connecting the regional countries 
might offer strategic opportunities, such as thawing relations between 
Israel and Turkey, reaching an agreement on Cyprus, and re-energizing 
Turkey’s efforts to join the EU.29 Although it initially served as a catalyst to 
revive the negotiations on the island on 11 February 2014 after a two-year 
break, the on-going competition in the disputed areas has overshadowed 
the prospects of solution, and turned into another obstacle in the way 
of finding a solution for Cyprus. Since then, any attempt to enter the 
disputed area by RoC authorized companies has elicited a response from 
the Turkish side, sometimes in the form of Turkish warships blocking 
drilling ships and declaring immediate area as unsafe for navigation.30 
Although it is still early to know the final impact of these gas reserves 
on regional peace and co-operation, the discoveries have already 
affected regional alliances and altered Turkey’s energy strategy. First of 
all, the alignment between the positions of Israel, the RoC and Greece, 
arguing that a pipeline from the region would provide cheaper natural 
gas to Europe and contribute to EU’s quest for diversifying its sources 
of supply, has shifted the regional balance of power. In addition to an 
agreement between Israel and Egypt in February 2018 on exporting 
Israeli gas to Egypt, the leaders of Cyprus, Egypt, and Greece have met 
on several occasions to boost cooperation among the three countries.31 
(29) Matthew Bryza, “Israel-Turkey Pipeline Can Fix Eastern Mediterranean”, Bloomberg Business, 
20 January 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-20/israel-turkey-pipeline-
can-fix-eastern-mediterranean (Accessed 15 March 2014). Also see Ayla Gürel and Laura Le 
Cornu, “Can Gas Catalyse Peace in the Eastern Mediterranean?”, Italian Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 49 (2), 2014, pp. 11-33.
(30) See for example MiddleEastEye, 8 October 2014; BBC, 15 May 2015; Hurriyet Daily News, 10 
February 2018. 
(31) “Energy, peace focus of Tripartite Summit”, Cyprus Mail, 21 November 2017, https://cyprus-
mail.com/2017/11/21/energy-eu-relations-focus-tripartite-summit/ (Accessed 10 February 
2018). 
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This rapprochement would no doubt add a layer to the on-going dispute 
between Turkey, the RoC and TRNC over territorial waters and EEZs.
In terms of Turkey’s energy strategy, the possibility of a new pipeline 
through Turkey to Europe would contribute to its goal of becoming 
an energy hub in the region. As Turkey is situated at the centre of the 
transport routes from Levant to Europe, it hopes that any gas from the 
Levant will pass through Turkey en route to Europe. The fact that these 
gas discoveries occurred at a time when Turkey’s relations with Israel were 
deteriorating helped pave the way for the rapprochement between Israel, 
the RoC and Greece. Furthermore, the tension between Turkey and the 
RoC over exploration and drilling rights will likely to continue blocking any 
possibility that a pipeline will be built through Turkey anytime soon.32
Outbreak of Arab Uprisings and Regional 
Instability
The chain of events that triggered popular quests for good governance 
and better living conditions throughout the MENA at the end of 2010 
has created serious challenges for the entire region, including Turkey. 
They also have effected Turkey’s relations with the other countries in the 
region. 
Turkey was unprepared for the momentous changes in the region when 
the uprisings began. During the previous decade, Turkey had successfully 
developed closer economic and political relationships with the existing 
ruling regimes. The uprisings disrupted these relationships. When 
confronted with a choice between supporting the regimes or emerging 
(32)  Gareth M. Winrow, “The Southern Gas Corridor and Turkey’s Role as an Energy Transit 
State and Energy Hub”, Insight Turkey, Vol. 15 (1), 2013, p. 157.
opposition movements, Turkey faced a dilemma of ‘ethics versus 
interest’.33 It soon became clear that supporting autocratic regimes could 
in the long run undermine Turkey’s ambition for regional leadership, while 
providing support for the opposition would also jeopardize its interests 
in the long term if the expected change did not occur. This dilemma 
was evident early when Turkey came out with a strong support of the 
popular uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, but was quite reluctant to support 
the opposition in Libya and Syria due to deeper economic and political 
involvement.
In Egypt, Turkey almost immediately welcomed the collapse of the 
regime and supported the interim government and then the subsequent 
government of President Mohammed Morsi. However, his ousting within 
a year as a result of a military coup adversely affected Turkey’s position 
and the strong language used by Turkish leaders in their condemnation of 
the military takeover led to the expulsion of the Turkish Ambassador on 
23 November 2013. In response, Turkey declared Egyptian Ambassador 
to Ankara persona non-grata and downgraded its diplomatic relations with 
Egypt.34 Since then, having taken a strong position against the military 
intervention, and despite various attempts to restore ties, Turkey failed to 
improve its relations with Egypt to its previous level.35
(33) Öniş, “Turkey and the Arab Revolutions”, p. 6.
(34) Press Release No. 310, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 November 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.
tr/no_-310_-23-november-2013_-press-release-regarding-the-relations-between-turkey-and-
egypt.en.mfa (Accessed 14 December 2014).
(35) For instance, with the mediation attempt of Saudi Arabia, in which King Salman travelled to 
Ankara following his Cairo visit in April 2016, and as a result, Turkey invited Egyptian President 
Abdel Fattah el Sisi to Istanbul for the summit of the Organization for Islamic Conference in 
April 2016, though finally Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sameh Shoukry attended it on 
behalf of President Sisi. Moreover, the two countries’ foreign ministers met during the Non-
Aligned Movement Summit in Venezuela in September 2016. See MiddleEastEye, 17 October 
2016; Hurriyet Daily News, 6 April 2016; Daily News Egypt, 19 May 2018.
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In Libya, Turkey was initially cautious, mainly due to its economic interests. 
As the situation deteriorated, Turkey’s top priority became the evacuation 
of the almost 25,000 Turkish workers residing in the country. At this point, 
Turkey did not support international intervention, with Prime Minister 
Erdoğan arguing that ‘military intervention by NATO in Libya or any other 
country would be totally counter-productive’ (Reuters, 14 March 2011). Yet 
after Turkey successfully evacuated its citizens (Milliyet, 2 March 2011) and 
the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1973 on 17 March, approving 
the creation of a ‘no-fly zone’ as well as authorizing member states to take 
‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians in Libya (UNSC, 2011), Turkey 
changed its position, and called for Gadhafi’s resignation on 3 May. Turkey 
then supported the NATO operation with naval and air forces. (Shadid, 
2011).
However, by far the most intricate challenge the Arab uprisings have 
created for Turkey was the unrest in Syria, which quickly metastasised 
into a civil war. The Syrian Civil War has become a litmus test for the JDP 
policies in the Levant in general. The fact that Syria shares an 899 km 
border with Turkey, with ethnic Kurds and Arabs living on both sides, and 
considering the chequered history of the relationship between the two 
countries, the government initially hesitated. Prime Minister Erdoğan had 
earlier believed that his personal rapport with Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad, developed over a decade-long political and economic investment 
and cultivation of friendship, would provide him with a leverage to 
convince al-Assad to behave in such a way to ease tensions and avert the 
disturbances through reforms. However, the regime did not respond to 
the pleas and reacted with force when faced with popular demands.
When faced with an intractable autocratic regime in Damascus and 
what seemed to be a strong uprising in the north of the country, Turkey 
reversed its policy and started to support the opposition groups. It 
seemed that Turkey, having seen the regime changing capability of the 
earlier uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen, underestimated the 
power of Assad regime in Syria. Turkey also may have underestimated the 
determination of outside powers, such as Russia and Iran, to support the 
regime in Syria.36 While Turkey initially tried to persuade the international 
community to launch an intervention, as it did in Libya, this time global 
actors were not willing to get involved. This would lead to a situation 
where Turkey found itself on the same side with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in 
aiding opposition groups, yet its inability to organize them into a workable 
alternative to the Assad regime contributed to the reluctance of other 
countries to get involved. Moreover, Turkey’s active involvement in the 
Syrian crisis has created a rather negative narrative and has impacted its 
international image, with accusations that it pursued a sectarian foreign 
policy and supported radical Islamists associated with al-Qaeda.37
Humanitarian concerns related to the crisis have also become important, 
as Turkey has received more than 3.5 million refugees from Syria. Besides 
the obvious difficulties involved in caring for such large numbers of 
people, the border between the two countries has, at times, ceased to 
function and has allowed illicit movements of radical Islamists going to 
fight in Syria. Moreover, the threat level for Turkey in connection with 
radical groups operating in the region increased considerably after the 
rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2011. The threat 
posed by such groups would continue to rise as northern Syria turned 
into a multi-front conundrum with fighting occurring between ISIL and 
Kurdish groups, between opposition groups and the al-Assad regime, and 
sometimes between ISIL and the opposition forces for control of areas 
near the Turkish border.
(36)  Jonny Hogg and Tülay Karadeniz, “Assad’s staying power leaves Turkey frustrated and 
exposed”, Reuters, 27 May 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/us-syria-crisis-
turkey-idUSKBN0E710G20140527 (Accessed 15 December 2014).
(37) Seymour M. Hersh, “The Red Line and the Rat Line”, London Review of Books, Vol. 36 (8), 
2014, pp. 21-24.
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The destructive impact of the conflict also extended into Turkey, as 
seen by the terrorist attacks in Reyhanlı (May 2013), Diyarbakır (June 
2015), Suruç (July 2015), Ankara (October 2015), İstanbul (January and 
March 2016), and Gaziantep (August 2016) by ISIL-affiliated individuals. 
Moreover, when ISIL forces, coming out of Iraq and occupying a sizeable 
chunk of northern Syria, clashed with Kurdish groups over the control 
of the town of Ayn al-Arab (Kobane in Kurdish), Turkey found itself 
under heavy international pressure to assist the Kurds, while no other 
international actor was willing to send ground forces. Although Turkey 
eventually allowed support units of Iraqi Kurds to be deployed from 
northern Iraq through Turkish territory to Syria,38 the fighting between 
Kurdish groups and ISIL would spark unrest inside Turkey in October 2014 
when Turkey refused involvement on behalf of the Kurds.39 
Furthermore, on 11 June 2014, after ISIL seized the city of Mosul in Iraq, 
it took 49 Turkish Consulate staff as hostages. In response, Turkey began 
to gradually align itself with the US-led coalition against ISIL. After months 
of negotiations, on 19 February 2015, Turkey and the US reached an 
agreement to ‘train and equip’ Syrian opposition forces. A few days after 
the agreement, Turkey conducted an operation inside Syria to evacuate 
the remains of Süleyman Shah, the supposed grandfather of the first 
Ottoman Sultan, and to rescue the soldiers guarding the tomb in order to 
avoid another hostage situation. This operation, along with the ‘train and 
equip’ agreement temporarily provided manoeuvring space for Turkey and 
intensified its contribution to the US-led coalition forces by allowing the use 
of İncirlik and Diyarbakır airbases in Turkey for the airstrikes against ISIL.
(38) “Turkey to Let Iraqi Kurds Cross to Syria to Fight ISIS”, The New York Times, 20 October 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/world/middleeast/kobani-turkey-kurdish-fighters-syria.
html (Accessed 10 December 2014).
(39) Murat Yetkin, “Control Issues in Ankara”, Hürriyet Daily News, 11 October 2014, http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/control-issues-in-ankara.aspx?pageID=449&nID=72829&NewsCatID=409
(Accessed 10 December 2014). 
The intervention of Russia into the Syrian Civil War in late September 2015 
on behalf of the al-Assad Regime also impacted Turkey’s strategic interest 
in the region. Turkey’s geopolitical positioning in Syria was weakened 
considerably thanks to Russia and Iran’s support for Assad, as well as the 
substantial support provided by the US and Russia to Kurdish groups. 
Finally, Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter jet when it violated Turkish 
airspace on 24 November 2015 led to suspension of Turkish military 
flights over Syria. The thaw in Turkish-Russian relations after June 2016 
would change the equation again,40 allowing Turkish Air Force to return to 
Syrian theatre. Since then, Turkey has taken an active role in Syria through 
direct military operations, such as the Euphrates Shield operation from 
August 2016 to March 2017 and the Olive Branch from January 2018 to 
May 2018. 
Similarly, when the US chose to cooperate with Kurdish groups on the 
ground against ISIL from Autumn 2015 onwards, Turkey’s relations 
with the US became strained. In the end, as a result of the combination 
of factors such as regional dynamics, Turkey’s threat perceptions, 
disagreements with its Western allies, as well as the thaw in Turkish-
Russian relationship, Turkey’s insistence on the removal of al-Assad has 
softened and Turkey has become an active member of the Russian-
led Astana process, which is paving the way for establishment of ‘de-
confliction zones’ in parts of Syria.
In retrospect, it seems that Turkey made a number of miscalculations, 
over issues such as its own leverage in Syria, the endurance of the Syrian 
regime, the power of opposition forces, and the intentions of outside 
powers. Although it has gained some manoeuvring space following its 
Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations, this may not provide the 
(40)  “Ankara-Moscow pivot: a new era begins”, DW, 8 July 2016, http://www.dw.com/en/ankara-
moscow-pivot-a-new-era-begins/a-19456985 (Accessed 10 May 2018).
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results Turkey had initially hoped. Thus, the Syrian imbroglio has become 
quicksand for Turkey, erasing the progress it had made over the course 
1990s and 2000s in improving its political and economic ties to the Levant. 
Changing Balance of Power
The developments in the Levant over the last decade, i.e. the failure of 
Arab-Israeli peace process, the US invasion of Iraq, discovery of offshore 
hydrocarbons, the Arab uprisings, and the emergence of new players 
including non-state actors, have had a serious impact on the regional 
balance of power. In addition to regional countries, extra-regional powers, 
chief among them are the US and Russia, have been seeking to maintain 
and/or increase their influence throughout the region via military 
presence and political alignments. The US has had strategic advantages 
in the Levant since the days of the Cold War, and was able to consolidate 
its status after it ended.41 In contrast, the military presence of the Soviet 
Union was almost eliminated after the end of the Cold War, and Russia 
has been trying to re-establish it presence in the region. The Syrian crisis 
has provided an opportunity for Russia to achieve that aim.42
At the same time, as Turkey’s relations with Israel developed in the 
post-Cold War era, a Turkey-US-Israel triangle has emerged as one of 
the cornerstones of the US policy in the Levant.43 The emergence of 
disagreements within the triangle and its changing geometry over the 
last decade, sometimes caused by independent moves from Turkey 
(41)  Derek Lutterbeck and Georgij Engelbrecht, “The West and Russia in the Mediterranean: 
Towards a Renewed Rivalry?”, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 14 (3), 2009, p. 392. 
(42) Lutterbeck and Engelbrecht, “The West and Russia”, p. 393. 
(43) Another triangle that the US based its Levant policy has been the US-Egypt-Israel triangle. 
See Jon B. Alterman and Haim Malka, “Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Geometry”, The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35 (3), 2012, p. 111.
and Israel clashing with US priorities, has affected both the US policy in 
the region and Turkey’s position in the Levant.44 The bilateral relations 
between the US and Turkey were severely damaged by the refusal of 
the Turkish Parliament in 2003, prior to the US invasion of Iraq, to grant 
permission to US troops to pass through Turkey en route to Iraq, and then 
the internment of Turkish soldiers in Sulaymania, in northern Iraq, by 
the US forces. The latter incident froze the relationship and led to rise of 
persistent anti-American sentiments in Turkey.45 Though tension between 
the two countries was eased somewhat after the election of President 
Barack Obama in 2008, the divergent policy lines remained, and has again 
deteriorated following the 16 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey.46 
Along the way, the rise of ISIL and its rapid advance in Iraq and Syria from 
summer 2014 onwards had created a dangerous security vacuum at 
the core of the region and induced a US-led coalition to begin airstrikes 
against the group in early August 2014. While the US hoped for Turkish 
military contribution to this effort, in addition to access to Turkey’s 
İncirlik airbase, Turkey demurred, insisting that the coalition prioritize the 
removal of al-Assad and the creation of a buffer zone in northern Syria, 
and initially allowed İncirlik to be used only for logistical and humanitarian 
support. The alignment of positions between Turkey and the US took 
some time to achieve. The countries signed a protocol for the ‘train-and-
equip’ program of the Syrian opposition on 19 February 2015 and an 
agreement that allowed coalition forces to use of İncirlik and Diyarbakır 
airbases for airstrikes on 23 July 2015. Despite these agreements, the two 
(44) Alterman and Malka, “Shifting Eastern Mediterranean Geometry”, p. 118.
(45) Füsun Türkmen, “Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 
10 (1), 2009, p. 123; Alan Makovsky, “U.S. Policy towards Turkey”, Morton I. Abramowitz (ed.), 
Turkey's Transformation and American Policy, New York, The Century Foundation, 2000, p. 230.
(46) Kostas Ifantis, “The US and Turkey in the fog of Regional Uncertainty”, Hellenic Observatory 
Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, No 73, 2013, p. 15; Tolga Tanış, “10 Soruda Darbe 
Sonrası Washington-Ankara İlişkileri”, Hürriyet, 19 July 2016, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/10-
soruda-darbe-sonrasi-washington-ankara-iliskileri-40154897 (Accessed 22 August 2016).
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countries’ goals continue to diverge, especially concerning the priority of 
operations and the ideal final outcome. 
Finally, the US cooperation with the PKK-affiliated PYD/YPG from Autumn 
2015 onwards, which turned the Kurdish groups into de-facto US ground 
forces in its war against ISIL, would put the two allies at loggerheads.47 
The US reliance on Kurdish groups in the region, in accordance with its 
‘no American boots on the ground’ policy, has triggered Turkey’s survival 
instinct as the country has been struggling with the terror challenge 
posed by the PKK since early 1980s. This fear of a an emboldened PKK, 
in addition to already existing ISIL threat, would motivate Turkey’s two 
consecutive operations inside Syrian territory to fend developing PKK-
related threats in border areas.
The Turkey-Israel part of the triangle has also suffered heavily since 
2010. After Israeli soldiers killed Turkish activists in the Mavi Marmara 
raid, Turkey recalled its ambassador, cancelled joint military exercises, 
called for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, and, shortly 
after the release of the UN Palmer Report in September 2011, expelled 
Israel’s ambassador. Despite several attempts to patch up relations, a 
gridlock remained until US President Obama brokered an apology from 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Prime Minister Erdoğan on 
22 March 2013. The rapprochement between the two countries, though, 
had to wait the signing of an agreement on 26 June 2016 to normalize 
diplomatic relations.48 Since then, while political relations between the two 
countries have suffered from occasional flare-ups, economic cooperation 
has continued unabated. 
(47) Mustafa Aydın, “Operation Olive Branch”, Hürriyet Daily News, 25 January 2018, http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/mustafa-aydin/operation-olive-branch-126248 (Accessed 9 April 
2018).
(48) “Turkey, Israel Sign Deal to Normalize Diplomatic Relations”, NBC News, 28 June 2016, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/turkey-israel-sign-deal-normalize-diplomatic-
relations-n600186 (Accessed 9 April 2018).
Levantine Challenges on Turkish Foreign Policy
The problems in the US-Turkey-Israeli triangle have naturally affected 
the decision making in the region. While Israel had previously closely 
allied with Turkey on many international issues, with the downturn in 
the relations, it moved to cultivate closer relations with Greece and the 
RoC in an attempt to transfer the region’s newly discovered offshore 
energy resources to Europe, bypassing Turkey.49 But the realignment went 
beyond a simple cooperation to find a way to transfer regional riches. 
Thus, Israel and Greece conducted a joint military exercise in 2008, Israeli 
pilots were allowed to practice in Greek airspace, and the two countries 
signed a security cooperation agreement in 2011. The cooperation 
opened the way for Greece to attempt to fill the vacuum left by Turkey.50
As the US-Israel-Turkey triangle experienced troubles, Russia has been 
trying to increase its military presence in the Levant. While the military 
balance in the Levant favoured the West overwhelmingly, the hands-
off policy of the Obama administration in Syria gave Russia a chance to 
return to the Middle Eastern to counter-balance western dominance in 
the region.51 Although Russia had been aligned with the Syrian regime 
since the outbreak of the crisis, supporting Syrian diplomatic manoeuvres 
and supplying the regime with arms, the active involvement of Russia in 
the conflict, first evident in its military build-up in September 2015, has 
changed the equilibrium not only in Syria but also in the wider region. 
Intense Russian airstrikes halted the advance of both rebel groups 
and ISIL forces and eventually strengthened the regime. Furthermore, 
Turkey’s downing of a Russian jet in November 2015 provided Russia 
with an opportunity to reinforce its forces with missiles and an additional 
(49) Oğurlu, “Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean”, p. 6.
(50) Meliha Benli Altunışık, “The Eastern Mediterranean: Back to Power Politics”, Hürriyet Daily 
News, 8 October 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=the-
eastern-mediterranean-back-to-power-politics-2011-09-08 (Accessed 4 Feburary 2014); Oğurlu, 
“Rising Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean”, p. 7. 
(51) Lutterbeck and Engelbrecht, “The West and Russia”, p. 394.
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airbase in Hmeimim. While its military presence and initiatives in Syria 
have provided Moscow a permanent foothold in the Levant, its pragmatic 
partnerships have also enhanced Russia’s global posture.52
In the energy arena, too, Russia has tried to create an area of influence 
in the region by supporting the arguments of the RoC over exploration 
and licensing rights, as well as its unilateral declaration of EEZ. As a result, 
the Russian firm Novatek was among the companies bidding for the 
exploration licenses in the RoC’s second tender in May 2012.53
The emergence of new non-state actors, such as ISIL, has also affected 
regional politics. The combined effect of the Arab uprisings, the 
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, the sectarian policies of the then Iraqi 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and the civil war in Syria have all facilitated 
the emergence of ISIL as a key player. While several moves in different 
parts of the region by ISIL militants revealed its capacity to threaten 
wider regional and global security, organizing a suitable ground force 
to fight against it proved difficult and would eventually strengthen the 
role of Kurdish groups in northern Syria, providing them with leverage 
in the region. The involvement of other regional actors such as Iran and 
Saudi Arabia with their sectarian views has also complicated the regional 
politics. While the US-led international coalition’s operations against ISIL 
both in Iraq and Syria have steadily weakened its position in the region, 
the continuing political instability of the region creates a fruitful space 
for the emergence of new non-state actors, affecting the policymaking 
abilities of all of the countries in the region. 
(52) Mustafa Aydın, “Putin Reloded”, Hürriyet Daily News, 8 March 2018, http://www.
hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/mustafa-aydin/putin-reloaded-128401 (Accessed 20 May 2018).
(53) Mehmet Öğütçü, “Rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean: The Turkish Dimension”, 
Mediterranean Policy Program, Washington D.C., German Marshall Fund, 2012, p. 4.
Conclusion
Turkey’s relations with the Levant started to develop in late 1990s and 
have improved significantly during successive JDP governments. The 
political transformation of the country and the emergence of new 
business communities, eager to operate in the region, have supported 
such change. As a result, the government developed innovative tools 
such as visa-liberalization, conflict mediation, jointly established industrial 
zones, free trade areas, and joint cabinet meetings to develop Turkey’s 
relations with the region.
However, the emergence of new challenges following the Arab uprisings 
has limited Turkey’s reach in the Levant. While the increased instability 
in the region affected Turkey’s political relations with the countries of the 
Levant, sustained crises have also undermined its economic relationships. 
In the wake of the popular uprisings in the region, Turkey, despite its 
initial confusion, took the side of the masses against the existing regimes. 
However, as popular uprisings finally failed to gain the upper hand, 
especially in Egypt and Syria, Turkey’s activism during the Arab uprisings 
has since led to weakening of Turkey’s position in the Levant. 
Moreover, Turkey’s attraction to local populations and the countries had 
mainly stemmed from its democratic features and close relationship with 
the EU. As its democratic credentials increasingly came under suspicion 
in recent years and its relationship with the EU undermined, Turkey’s 
appeal and leverage in the region has weakened. So much so that 
Turkey’s political relations today with the Levant countries are not even 
as strong as the pre-Arab uprisings era, with the country maintaining only 
a decreased diplomatic representation in Syria, Egypt, and Israel. This 
diplomatic and political disconnect has undermined Turkey’s economic 
connections as well. Under such conditions, while its geographic position 
at the centre of transportation routes for the region’s recently discovered 
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off-shore natural resources might in the future assist Turkey in its 
ambition to become an energy hub in the Eastern Mediterranean, existing 
tensions with the regional countries hinder the realization of this goal. It 
is clear that, in order to affect regional developments to favour its long-
term interests, Turkey needs to recalibrate its disorganised policies in the 
Levant.
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